Le frottole sulla moneta del Guernsey

Le frottole sulla moneta del Guernsey

Chi racconta la frottola della moneta-debito, dice che esiste una moneta priva di debito, la
sterlina delle isole del Guernsey.

Nelle isole del Guersney, nel canale della Manica, all’inizio del XIX secolo, mancavano i
capitali e servivano opere pubbliche. Il Governatore decide di stampare moneta,
tutelandosi in vario modo contro il rischio di un aumento dei prezzi, ovvero decidendo che,
se fosse stato necessario, avrebbe introdotto imposte e diminuito la quantità di moneta.

L’abbondanza di risorse inutilizzate invece ha garantito la costruzione delle opere
pubbliche e una discreta crescita in assenza di incrementi dell'inflazione.

Oggi la sterlina delle Isole è una moneta identica a qualsiasi altra moneta, ma la leggenda
continua e c'è chi sostiene che nelle isole del Guernsey si stampa moneta liberamente e per
questo non esisterebbe debito pubblico né imposte. Da me contattato via email, l'ufficio
studi del governo locale mi ha inviato quattro documenti che smentiscono le leggende sul
Guernsey.

La stampa di moneta per finanziare la spesa pubblica è avvenuta solo per pochi anni
all'inizio del XIX secolo e le isole oggi emettono moneta e hanno una imposizione fiscale
come tutti gli Stati moderni.

A seguire i documenti ricevuti dal Guernsey

1 - It would be quite wrong to suggest that Guernsey’s currently favourable economic
position is in any way as a direct result of the Guernsey note issue. I estimate that the value
of the note issue to the Exchequer is of the order of £1.5 million per annum which equates
to about 1% of States Revenues, the main source of revenue being income tax levied on
earnings of individuals and companies.
The benefit of the note issue is that the value of the total amount in circulation amounts, in
effect, to an interest free loan from the holders of banknotes to the Exchequer. The value to
the Guernsey Exchequer is therefore no different from the benefit derived by any other
independent note issuing authority.
It is essential to understand that Guernsey does not have its own monetary system but is
part of the United Kingdom system. Bank of England notes are legal tender in Guernsey
and circulate alongside Guernsey notes. The total withdrawal of Guernsey notes would not
have any economic effect on the Island as they would simply be replace by Bank of England
notes. The local Exchequer would however lose about 1% of its income which would either
mean that less public expenditure could be afforded, or a relatively small increase in
taxation would be required.
The circulation of Guernsey notes does not affect inflation because Guernsey does not have
a monetary system of its own. The existence of Guernsey notes therefore means that less
Bank of England notes circulate in the Island than would otherwise be necessary.
One of the main reasons for Guernsey’s current ability to have relatively low rates of
indirect taxation is that as a matter of policy the Government (The States of Guernsey)
does not borrow for public purposes (other than in respect of self financing activities, ie
electricity, etc). This policy means that all taxes raised are available for public purposes
and interest receipts augment taxation receipts.
There are currently many desirable projects for capital expenditure within the Island that
cannot be afforded if our policy of not borrowing is to be upheld. If the States of Guernsey
were to decide that those projects should go ahead, and were also unwilling to raise taxes
by the level necessary, then Guernsey would have no alternative but to borrow with a
consequent future liability to repay both interest and principal on the debt. In such
circumstances the Guernsey note issue would certainly not provide any additional income
to that currently available.”
Extract from correspondence on “Value of Guernsey note issue”

2 - Options may differ as to the exact legal status of Guernsey’s currency but for all
practical purpose it can be regarded as sterling. Thus:
¨ Bank of England notes and coins are legal tender here and are accepted by all businesses
and banks alongside our own issue:
¨ our note issue is the debt of the States of Guernsey denominated in sterling, and;
¨ in accounting for and recording transactions, assets and liabilities, no distinction is made
between UK currency and Guernsey currency (except, of course, where businesses such as
clearing banks may need to keep a separate record for their own internal purposes of States
of Guernsey notes and Bank of England notes held).
It follows that there is no “exchange rate” between Guernsey currency and sterling; they
are the same currency. Similarly, mechanisms to maintain parity are not needed. However,
it should be said the Guernsey notes are neither legal tender in the UK nor are they
generally acceptable. Furthermore, UK banks may make a charge for changing Guernsey
notes for Bank of England notes, although this represents the cost incurred by the bank in
returning the notes to Guernsey to obtain value, rather than an exchange rate.
Extract from correspondence on “Legal Tender Status”

3 - GUERNSEY CURRENCY ISSUE
Guernsey uses sterling as its currency and issues its own notes and coins denominated in
sterling. The issue is a debt of the States of Guernsey and is backed by the General Revenue
investments of the States.
Guernsey notes and coins are legal tender in the Island but not outside, where their
acceptability is limited. Bank of England notes and UK Treasury coins are also legal tender
in Guernsey and circulate alongside the Guernsey issue.
In common with other currency issues, the value of the total amount of Guernsey notes
and coins in circulation is, in effect, an interest free loan from the holders, which may be
invested for the benefit of the exchequer, the income being known as seigniorage. The
circulation of Guernsey notes and coins is approximately £30 million, currently earning
around £1 million per annum.
The first issue of Guernsey notes was in 1816 and was of considerable benefit to the Island
by helping to finance large States projects. However, the States of Guernsey currency is
now issued to local banks on demand in the conventional manner, for which the banks pay
face value.

4 - STATES OF GUERNSEY NOTE ISSUE
The Markets were the first public work of any magnitude to be financed by means of a note
issue, though States’ notes had been issued for other purposes at an earlier date. The issue
of States’ notes was first mooted some years before the acquisition and improvement of the
Markets was first thought of, for on 24 May 1811 the States were invited to appoint a
Committee to consider, inter alia, the advisability of issuing States’ notes; but this met with
little encouragement, for on 14 November 1811 the Committee reported that they were
unanimously of the opinion that the proposal was of doubtful propriety, and as a result the
States decided “d’abandonner entierement le projet d’emettre des dires billets.”
In 1815 the need for improving the Public Market (at that time an open one) was beginning
to be felt, and the States appointed a Committee to consider the matter. This Committee
reported on 29 October 1816, making recommendations for the acquisition of property and
the erection of a covered Market, and recommended as a means of furnishing the
wherewithal to carry out this project, the issue of States’ notes to the value of £6,000.
The arguments put forward at this time in favour of States’ issue are interesting, and the
following is a rough translation of an extract from the Committee’s report: -
“The Committee recommends that the expense should be met by the issue of States’ notes
of £1 sterling to the value of £6,000, of which the issue will be simple, and will not offer
the least difficulty when the expenditure and receipts are taken into consideration, and
that these notes will be available not only for the payment of the New Market, but also of
Torteval Church, roads to construct, and other expenses of the States, and above all when
one considers that the banks already have their notes in circulation for more than
£50,000, whereas it is now proposed to restrict the States’ issue to £6,000. The notes to be
printed on the best paper, expressly manufactured with the word ‘States’ in the paper
(watermark?), and from a plate engraved by the best artist, each note numbered and
bearing the signature of three men well known to the Island; the risk of forgery is nothing
to fear, as no one would go to the expense and risk of counterfeiting with so little hope of
success.
In this manner it appears easy to provide a permanent revenue to the States, sufficient not
only to provide for the purchase and erection of the Market, but also to create an
amortisation fund to extinguish the debt of the States”.
The proposal was, however, rejected, not apparently on account of objection to the
financial policy proposed, but because the acquisition of the Markets was not deemed
desirable.
The First Issue
On 17 October 1816, the first issue of States’ notes was authorised, for a sum of £4,000, for
coast preservation works, Torteval Church, and Jerbourg Monument. These notes were
issued subject to redemption, in three stages, on 15 April 1817, and every Saturday
thereafter; 15 October 1817, and 15 April 1818, and not for reissue.
The Committee’s report recommending this issue states: “In this manner, without
increasing the debt of the States, it will be possible to finish these works, leaving sufficient
money in the exchequer for other needs”.
It is also interesting to note that at that time the Supervisor must have been a very much
occupied person, as the Bailiff in his remark says … “The Supervisor and the members of
the Court generally have already too much to do to impose upon them the work of issue”,
and it was recommended and adopted that this be entrusted to a Committee, of three
‘personnes de confiance’ exclusively charged with this duty who will pay on the order of the
Supervisor, and receive them back, when paid in, from the Receiver of Impot, for
cancellation.
The Supervisor of that time with this revenue and expenditure of £14,000 odd was too
busy to issue and to attend to the cancellation of £4,000 worth of notes. The Supervisor of
today, however, with a revenue and expenditure for which he is responsible amounting to
millions, as well as a multitude of other things besides, has to find time for an issue of
some £300,000.
In October 1918, a further attempt was made to acquire the site and to construct the
Markets to be financed by means of a note issue, but again with failure, and it was not until
May 1920, that the Committee, faint yet pursuing, met with success, and were authorised
to issue States’ notes to the value of £4,500 for the markets, redeemable in 10 years, out of
Impot duties and the revenue butchers’ shops.
Increase to £10,000
This issue was quickly followed by others, and in September 1821, the Finance Committee
reported that there were, other than notes for the markets, £5,300 notes in circulation, and
the States accepted the recommendation of that Committee that this number could be
increased to £10,000 without danger, as the most advantageous method of meeting the
debt, both to the States finance and the public, who, far from being adverse to taking such
notes, seek them eagerly.
The Markets were opened in October 1822, and there is a legend that in the course of the
ceremony the Bailiff, Mr Daniel de Lisle Brock – destroyed by fire a number of cancelled
notes which had served in its erection. Reference, however, to three newspapers – the
“Star”, the “Gazette”, and the “Mercure” made no reference to this ritual which, therefore, I
think, must be regarded legendary.
In 1824 a further £5,000 was authorised for the Markets, and in March 1826, the Finance
Committee was authorised to increase the issue up to a total of £20,000, so to enable the
erection of Elizabeth College and certain parochial schools to be carried out.
In May 1826, the issue of a series of £5 notes was authorised.
In every case the States were most careful in the issue, signature and cancellation of notes,
and the impot of wines and spirits was there guarantee.
By 1829 the States’ note issue in circulation exceeded £48,000 and in 1837 over £55,000
were in circulation, and in the Billets d’Etats frequent references are made by eminent men
of those times that had it not been for the issue of the States’ notes important public works,
such as roads and buildings, could not have been carried out, and this was done without
interest costs to the Island, the result being that the influx of visitors was increased,
commerce was stimulated, and the prosperity of the Island vastly improved.
For the first ten years or so after the first notes were issued, no opposition seems to have
been encountered, but in 1826 certain members of the States, some of them members of
the Finance Committee, considered that the consent of the King in Council should be
obtained for capital works, contending that the financing of such works by note issue was
contrary to the Order in Council of 1819…”that the States’ should not exceed the amount of
their annual income without Royal Consent.”
That fine patriot, Daniel de Lisle Brock, spiritedly contested this opposition in his
comments published in the Billet d’État for 22 November 1826, with the result that the
proposition to refer the matter to Council was defeated.
Three years later, the same opponents to the note issue receiving no support from the
States, laid their complaint before Privy Council, which, in turn, was referred by the Privy
Council to the States, asking for an explanation. The States appointed the Finance
Committee to draft a reply, and there answer is published in the Billet for 23 December
1829, a masterpiece worthy of study, and this seems to be the last heard of the matter.
In 1827 the Old Bank was founded, followed by the Commercial Bank in 1830, and both
Banks circulated their own notes, and the Island seems to have been flooded with paper
money, so much that in September 1836, the matter was submitted to the consideration of
the States, and again the Bailiff – Daniel de Lisle Brock – makes a strong appeal to the
States in Favour of the right of the States to issue notes being supreme to that of the Banks,
and a Committee was noted to confer with the Banks and to defend the rights and interests
of the States and the community, so that the circulation of States’ noted shall not be
prejudiced.
From the reports of the debate one would have imagined that the result would have been
that the private issue of the Bank would have been withdrawn; but the truth was stranger
than fiction, for the result was an agreement between the States and the Banks that the
former should withdraw £15,000 worth of their notes and that in future their issue should
not exceed £40,000.
This agreement remained in force up till the outbreak of was in 1914, when the States’
notes in circulation valued £41,206.
Only Attempt at Forgery
As far as I’m aware, only one attempt at forgery was made, namely in 1895. The forgery,
however, was very crude and soon to be discovered by Mr Le Messurier, of the Old Bank.
As a result, however, the whole note issue was withdrawn and replaced by a new issue,
which we used to know as “greenbacks”.
Immediately following the outbreak of war, the demand for money was such that the Royal
Court passed on Ordinance making the States’ notes and those of the Banks legal tender,
and limiting the issues of the Banks to that at the moment in circulation, the result being
that the States then got their own back on the banks as their issue was unlimited, and the
demand was so great that the notes had to be printed in Guernsey to keep things going,
and both the Star Company and the Guernsey Press Company did remarkably good work in
turning out at very short service and very notice very serviceable 5/- and 10/- notes
respectively; and I well remember the hectic time that we had at the Office in keeping pace
with the demand. As supplies on special watermarked paper could be obtained in England,
these temporary notes where withdrawn and replaced. The note issue of the States rose to
£142,000 at 31st December 1918.
The next evening of importance was in 1921, when the currency was changed to British
Sterling, and as new notes could be obtained in time existing issues were over-printed with
the word “British”.
Advantage was taken of this change of currency necessitating a new note to make same of
more convenient size; but it is interesting to note that the same firm that printed the first
issues is still today supplying us with our requirements, viz.- Messrs Perkins, Bacon and
Co.
It will have been notice that at first States’ notes were signed by “three gentlemen of the
repute”, later reduced to two. Subsequently two Jurats of the Royal Court were authorised
to sign. In January 1921, these signatures were dispensed with and a facsimile of the
Supervisor’s signature was authorised with the actual signature of either the States
Accountant or the States Cashier.
Later the States decided that, with other safeguards, which, for obvious reasons, cannot be
made public, the printed facsimile of the signature of the Treasurer of the States would
suffice.
From 1918 onwards the States’ note issue continued to increase until at the time of the
Occupation there were in circulation £249,478.
Now comes a most interesting feature of our note issue. The Germans arrived and one of
their first acts was to declare that German paper money would have legal tender, but
strangely enough they took no steps to interfere with our not issue.
Resulting from lack of confidence in German money, coupled with the fact that the public
feared that the Banks might be taken over by the Germans, the demand for States’ of
Guernsey notes was continuous. So much so that we were placing into the Banks regularly
further supplies of new notes, of which, fortunately, there was a large supply in the States
coffers. This went on until the end of 1942, and to a very small extent during 1943, until
our stock of new notes was exhausted, when the amount of States’ notes in the hands of the
public amounted to £433,626. These notes, however, were not actually circulating and it
was a rarity to see a States’ note at all. What happened was that the lack of confidence in
foreign money had driven our good money underground, and that people were keeping
this in their homes rather than entrusting it to the Banks.
In 1941 most of the British Silver which was in circulation had, for the same reason,
disappeared, as had also Guernsey and British Copper, and there was an acute shortage of
small change. To meet this, authority was sought from the Germans to issue small
denomination notes of the values of 6d., 1s.3d., 2s.6d. and 5/-. The first issue amounted to
£5,000 but the Germans would only agreed to this issue being put into circulation against
the withdrawal of £5,000 worth of Guernsey £1 notes, which had to be handed to them.
We did not, however, withdraw these 5,000 notes from actual circulation but we took from
our safes notes to this value which were awaiting destruction as being too soiled for further
use, and we also took the precaution of having these passed through a printing press
printing front and back “withdrawn from circulation”, with the date.
Subsequently, the issue of these small denomination notes was found to be too small as
they also, to some extent, were going underground, and authority was obtained for a
further issue of 5,000 of these denominations but this time the Germans ordered that we
should withdraw from the Banks 5,000 British notes. These, of course, the States had to
buy, but again we took the precaution of recording the numbers of all these notes and
again over-printing them with the words “withdrawn from ciculation”.
Recently, since the Liberation, 2,000 of these 5,000 British Notes have been discovered in
Jersey and returned to us, and these will, in due course, be sent to the Bank of England for
cancellation.
Incidentally, I might record that the Bank of England has expressed its appreciation of our
caution in recording the numbers and over-printing them as we did.
Actually, we did not stick to the strict order of the Germans limiting the issue of these
small denomination notes to £10,000, for we actually issued £11,767.
These notes were printed locally by the Guernsey Press Company, to a design prepared by
one of their employees – Mr E W Vaudin – in the first instance on paper bearing the States
of Guernsey watermarked which was normally used for States Bonds and Dividend
Warrants, and subsequently, when the stock of this paper was exhausted, on a
watermarked paper obtained from France.
Later, it was a distinct rarity to find in one’s purse a States of Guernsey note of any
denomination at all and German money was practically the sole currency in circulation,
though the amount issued by the States was then £433,626.
When the invasion of France occurred we began to visualise the day when we should be
relieved, and German currency would no longer be wanted and we should revert to
sterling. We then began to wonder as to how we could quickly get rid of the German money
and how e would replace it with sterling. This matter was discussed with Mr Le Moal, of
the Guernsey Press Company (whose premises, incidentally were then occupied by the
Germans) and we went carefully into the stock of French watermarked paper which still
existed, and we came to the conclusion that we could print 35, £1 and 10/-d. notes which
would give us a sum sufficient to convert what we estimated to be the amount of German
currency in circulation. Designs were prepared by Mr Vaudin and there were printed
88,000 10/-d. notes; 171,000 £1 notes and 30,000 £5 notes making a total value of
£413,300. These were printed under the very noses of the Germans by the “Press” staff,
working at all sorts of odd hours when the Germans were not about, and the Germans
remained in total ignorance of this printing. For this the “Press” staff , working at all sorts
of odd hours when the Germans were not about, and the Germans remained in total
ignorance of this printing. For this the “Press” staff deserve the highest commendation.
We also had prepared the Orders for the “call in” of the German currency, ready for
publication in the local papers immediately the Liberation took place, so that when it was
announced on May 9th that we were to be liberated everything was prepared, depots had
been arranged in the country and the Banks primed, so that immediately Liberation
occurred we were able to proceed with the conversion of German Notes into sterling. This
came as a matter of extreme surprise to our British Liberation Force and I well remember
about half past ten in the morning of our Liberation Force and I well remember about half
past ten in the morning of our Liberation, Colonel Power telling us that the Liberating
Force had brought with them a large sum of British Notes as they were anxious that the
German Notes should be taken out of circulation at the earliest possible moment. The
surprise he evinced on hearing that the conversion had actually commenced half-an-hour
previously was worth seeing, and further when he heard how we had printed these notes
under the noses of the Germans, so as to be ready for this eventuality. I may say that in this
matter our action received the highest commendation from the British Authorities.
The amount of Reichsmarks which were converted in that very short time amounted to
3,224,729, equalling in sterling £344,522.6s.6d. As those of you who were here at the time
will remember this conversation went off very smoothly and very rapidly, and it was indeed
a great pleasure to have sterling again in our purses in place of the filthy German paper to
which we had perforce become accustomed. With this conversion issue, together with what
was already out, our note issue then amount to £778,148.
Early this year it became apparent that these small denomination notes had served their
purpose as the influx of British Silver had taken their place, and consequently these issues
were withdrawn from circulation, as were also the notes of £1 and 10/-d. denomination
issued prior to 1940, and substituted by our new issues which are now in circulation.
As a result of this calling in and also the fact that confidence in our money and the Banks
was again restored, Guernsey notes were returned in fairly big volume, so that the amount
of our note issue on the 1st June had been reduced to £256,644 actually in circulation.
To keep a circulation of this amount in being involves a great deal of work, as when notes
become dirty or torn they have to be withdrawn from circulation and replaced by others,
and cancellation and destruction of the old ones has to be effected. This keeps a small staff
engaged wholly on this work all the year round, but the cost of printing new notes for
replacement purposes and that of cancellation and destruction amount to less than 1% of
the total issue. It will therefore be seen that for the States to maintain their note issue is of
great economic value, as were it not for this issue a C Capital Loan of like amount would be
required, which could not be raised at anything like such favourable to the States why the
issue is not further increased. The answer, of course, is that we cannot put into circulation
more money than is demanded by the public. If we were to put out any sum above the
public demand this would of course, simply be returned to us through the Banks and we
should be no better off.

States Office GUERNSEY 5th June 1946

Cosa è il signoraggio

Cos'è il signoraggio

E' facile trovare fonti attendibili che spiegano cos'è il signoraggio.

Il signoraggio, scrive la Banca d’Italia

1 è “l'insieme dei redditi derivanti dall'emissione di moneta”. Deriva dal potere esclusivo di emettere moneta2 e consiste nella “differenza tra gli interessi sulle poste attive, finanziate da chi emette biglietti e il tasso di interesse, di solito zero, sui biglietti”3, ovvero, con riferimento all’euro, “il reddito originato dagli attivi detenuti in contropartita delle banconote in circolazione”

.

Due docenti di economia monetaria scrivono che “

la creazione di base monetaria in condizioni di monopolio dà la possibilità alla banca centrale di ottenere redditi (il cosiddetto signoraggio) pari alla differenza tra i ricavi ottenibili dall'investimento in attività finanziarie e reali e i (trascurabili) costi di produzione”4

.

E' utile la distinzione fatta dalla Banca del Canada

5

tra il signoraggio delle monete metalliche e il signoraggio delle banconote.

Per le monete metalliche il signoraggio è pari la differenza tra il valore facciale della moneta e il costo per produrla (e distribuirla), circa 88 centesimi per una moneta metallica da un dollaro, incassati dal governo.

Per le banconote è la differenza tra gli interessi ricavati dal portafoglio di titoli pubblici, acquistati quando si emette moneta, e i costi per produrre e distribuire le banconote. Se il tasso di interesse è del 5%, l'emissione di una banconota da 20 dollari frutta 96 centesimi l'anno: un dollaro l’anno di interessi meno 4 centesimi di costi.

C'è poi il signoraggio inteso come tassa da inflazione, “

cioè la riduzione di valore reale della moneta legale determinata dall'aumento dei prezzi”6

.

Le conferme

Le Banche Centrali possiedono un portafoglio titoli che offre un rendimento, il signoraggio.Nelle Relazione annuale della Banca d'Italia, ad esempio, si trova anche l'elenco delle riserve in valuta estera, oro e altro

7.

La Banca, ha scritto Greenspan, ex governatore della FED, “

si autofinanzia con gli interessi dei buoni del Tesoro e di altri beni che gestisce”8, mentre la Banca d'Italia9 “detiene anche un portafoglio finanziario”, e “le riserve valutarie sono gestite ... avendo riguardo alla massimizzazione del rendimento atteso nel lungo periodo

”.

E i bilanci confermano l'incasso degli interessi. La Banca d’Italia

10 incassa 4,5 miliardi di euro di interessi attivi, circa 5 miliardi di euro la Banca di Francia11, 1,7 miliardi di dollari la Federal Reserve Bank di Boston, derivanti quasi per intero da titoli di stato americani, con un profitto netto di circa 1550 milioni, 1450 dei quali versati al Tesoro americano come “interest on federal notes”12. Il reddito da interessi della Banca del Canada è di 2,2 miliardi di dollari l’anno13

. Circa 130 milioni pagano le spese generali, il resto finisce nelle casse del governo.

La frottola della sopravvenienza attiva e l'illusione di reddito per tutti

Chi non si arrende all'evidenza di un'emissione di moneta che non comporta ricavi, sostiene che l'emissione di moneta causerebbe per la Banca Centrale una sopravvenienza attiva.

Le sopravvenienze attive, dice il dizionario di economia della Garzanti, sono “

aumenti fortuiti delle attività, non derivanti da fatti della gestione ordinaria”. Nel “diritto tributario consistono nel conseguimento di proventi a fronte di spese perdite o oneri dedotti o di passività iscritte in bilancio in precedenti esercizi e nella sopravvenuta insussistenza di spese, perdite o oneri dedotti o di passività iscritte in bilancio in precedenti esercizi

”.

L'emissione di moneta non deriva da un’operazione straordinaria o da fatti fortuiti, e dunque non siamo in presenza di una sopravvenienza.

Si sostiene anche la sopravvenienza perché la moneta è un debito inesigibile della Banca, che tuttavia “

è l'unico intermediario che non crea rischi di credito o di liquidità” e “un conto aperto presso la Banca Centrale è privo di rischio”14

. Il debito non è quindi inesigibile. Se per assurdo lo fosse, o se le banche immaginassero che il credito verso la Banca può diventare inesigibile, smetterebbero di accettare la moneta, che la Banca non potrebbe emettere.

Se poi ci fosse una sopravvenienza attiva per la Banca Centrale, i bilanci bancari sarebbero pieni di sopravvenienze passive provocate dai crediti inesigibili. Sopravvenienze che naturalmente non troviamo in alcun bilancio.

------------------------------

Note

(1)

http://www.bancaditalia.it/bancomonete/signoraggio

(2) in tutto lo scritto col termine

moneta si intende la moneta in senso

lato ovvero tutto ciò che

svolge la funzione di moneta, a prescindere dalle sue caratteristiche fisiche: la

moneta

comprende le

monete metalliche

(per intenderci: le monete da 1 euro), le banconote o monete cartacee

e le

monete immateriali

come ad esempio i conti correnti bancari

(3) L'evoluzione delle banche centrali, Laterza, 1991, pag. 21. C. Goodhart è professore alla London

School of Economics

(4) Bagliano e Marotta, Economia monetaria, Il Mulino, pag. 18

(5) http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/backgrounders/bg-m3.html

(6) L.Campiglio, Tredici idee per ragionare di economia, Il Mulino, pag.127

(7) Vedasi Relazione del 2007, pag. 290 e seguenti

(8) A. Greenspan, L'età della turbolenza, Sperling & Kupfer, pag. 122 e seguenti

(9) vedasi pag. 8 di:

http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/relann/rel06/rel06it/bilancio/rel06_19_amm_bilancio.pdf

(10) pag. 18 di

http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/relann/rel06/rel06it/bilancio/rel06_19_amm_bilancio.pdf

(11) pag. 85 di

http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/telnomot/rapport/rap06gb.pdf

(12) pag. 6 di

http://www.bos.frb.org/about/ar/ar2006/financials.pdf

(13) http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/backgrounders/bg-m3.html

(14) Giannini, L'eta delle banche centrali, Il Mulino, pag. 402

Cosa non è il signoraggio

La definizione errata di signoraggio

Una definizione errata, assai diffusa, dice che il signoraggio è la differenza tra il valore di una banconota e il costo per produrla.

Se prendiamo una banconota da 50 €, vi raccontano, abbiamo in mano un pezzo di carta che costa 30 centesimi. Venduta a 50 €, la banconota farebbe guadagnare 49 euro e 70 centesimi alla Banca Centrale e ai suoi azionisti. Soldi che finirebbero nelle tasche dei banchieri centrali, invece di pagare i costi dello Stato o di essere distribuiti alla popolazione(il cosiddetto “reddito di cittadinanza”).

Perché è una definizione errata?

Perché la Banca Centrale non vende banconote.

Ogni anno la Banca d'Italia emette banconote per oltre 10 miliardi di euro l'anno. Se le vendesse, nel conto economico troveremmo la voce “ricavi da vendita di banconote” per oltre 10 miliardi di euro l'anno. Voce che non c'è, come manca un importo di oltre 10 miliardi nel conto economico. La Banca non vende moneta, che non è un bene simile al pane, ma uno strumento nelle del cittadino che usa la moneta per pagare.

La moneta è una passività dello stato patrimoniale, e ciò impedisce che ci possa essere un ricavo, ma su questo torneremo.

Se poi la Banca vendesse le banconote, non potrebbe aumentare la quantità di moneta che circola nell'economia. Cederebbe una banconota da 50 €, incassando 50 €: da una parte immetterebbe monete e dall'altro la ritirerebbe, non modificando la quantità di moneta che circola nell'economia, con la conseguenza che la Banca Centrale non avrebbe motivo d'esistere.

Forse incassa le banconote e le distribuisce sotto forma di utili ai propri azionisti? Nessun dato lo conferma, ma soprattutto sappiamo che la moneta serve a comprare titoli di Stato.

Sappiamo a cosa serve la moneta e, se se ne creasse più di quanto dichiarato, si verificherebbe un aumento del credito bancario e dell'inflazione. Perciò se fosse vera la frottola secondo cui le Banche Centrali creano moneta in modo occulto ci accorgeremmo di ciò attraverso gli effetti: un aumento non giustificabile del credito, della domanda, e quindi dell'inflazione. Tramite il moltiplicatore monetario, ogni euro di base monetaria, la moneta creata dalla Banca Centrale, si trasforma in diversi euro di credito concessi a imprese e consumatori, con effetti inflazionistici, segno inequivocabile che la quantità di moneta sta crescendo oltre quanto dichiarato dalla Banca Centrale.

Definizione errata e tesi senza senso

Se non si vendono le banconote, non ha senso chiedersi chi ne sia il proprietario al momento dell'emissione. Creare moneta non significa creare valore di cui qualcuno si appropria, almeno per come è emessa attualmente.

Inoltre non ha senso dire che la moneta assume valore in seguito all'accettazione e nemmeno c'è motivo di immaginare un reddito di cittadinanza, perché non c'è alcun reddito da distribuire.

Domande del tipo “di chi è la moneta al momento dell'emissione?” e proposte come il reddito di cittadinanza, paiono interessanti e altruistiche, ma perdono ogni senso di fronte all'inesistenza del reddito da signoraggio immaginato da chi offre la definizione errata di signoraggio.

Reddito da signoraggio che peraltro esiste, anche se non ha nulla a che fare con quanto sostenuto da chi propone la definizione errata